Editorial 1: It is crucial for India to embrace multi-domain operations
Introduction:
- India-China skirmish on the Arunachal Pradesh border has brought the Chinese threat on the front burner again.The threat had never decreased, but faded in public consciousness due to electioneering, bridge collapses, yatras, G-20, etc.
- Low-level and geographically restricted clashes will keep recurring. But what this should not do is to lull us into a complacent mindset that accepts such clashes. The threat, actually, is at the other extreme of technical advancement — in the concept of multi-domain operations (MDO).
Understanding multi-domain operations
- The term MDO has entered India’s military lecture circuit big time; however, it is being bandied about loosely, with its true characteristics and import being understood by few.
- MDO is not just actions on land, in sea, air, cyber, space and in the electromagnetic spectrum. It comprises operations conducted across multiple domains and contested spaces through convergence of capabilities to overcome an adversary’s strengths by presenting it with operational and/or tactical predicaments. This means having a common operating picture across all domains which forms the basis to decide the best tool to address a given task.
- Hence, it is not one service using capabilities in multiple domains to do a task (as is happening now), but the best positioned and capable operator of any service doing it across any domain. Thus, an Army coastal missile battery could be tasked to strike an enemy naval vessel detected by the radar of an Air Force aircraft; or an Air Force’s armed unmanned aerial vehicle on an Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance mission could be diverted to use its weapons against an Army target detected by a naval/civilian satellite; alternatively, a cyber weapon could be used.
- In simple terms, the MDO architecture uses any sensor and the best positioned shooter to accomplish objectives; the technical complexity and the command, control and communication (C3) structure required can well be imagined.
Working of MDO:
- MDO and its C3 structure would have inputs from all sensors to come up with an optimum engagement solution using artificial intelligence. This demands three things. First, all sensors (and other information input sources) must be capable of being hosted on the MDO architecture.
- Second, all solution providers (executors) must be able to receive inputs and instructions from the MDO C3 structure and carry them out.
- And third, if the link to the main structure is not available (say, jammed by the enemy), the mission command characteristics of distributed control would come into play so that operations continue.
- This is complicated, for one is talking of pioneering technologies that only nations with a developed scientific base and financial standing can afford. It would require a de novo look at doctrine, planning, acquisition, staffing and training.
Effects on india:
- This raises a doubt — does this affect India or is it a first world problem? Should New Delhi be pouring money and resources into an American concept (being progressed by the U.S. aggressively for the past decade) that may not concern us?
- The answer comes easy when one considers that China, which is attempting to match U.S. military power, is not lagging far; it is closely watching the Russia-Ukraine conflict where Western specialists are helping Ukrainians utilise the power of algorithms to fuse reconnaissance from space and choose the best shooters to strike Russian targets.
- If left behind, India would be deterred by denial during peacetime itself as Beijing, which has the technology and finances, masters it. India has no choice but to embrace MDO too.
Four-pronged strategy
- A four-pronged strategy is suggested.
- In the short-term, traditional physical domains must be stabilised, with critical deficiencies of the services being plugged.
- Our C3 networks need to be hardened and protected against cyber threats. Importantly, they need to be linked and synchronised so that seamless exchange of data is ensured.
- For the long term, a pilot project must be started now so that the true challenge of creating an MDO environment is grasped; presently, it’s just western literature driving theoretical discussions in the seminar circuit. The pilot project would identify the technologies required and, equally importantly, an idea of the monies necessary.
- To get the fundamentals of MDO right, it is vital to train and educate personnel starting now.
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U.S. Air Force has a one year-long training course ongoing to help develop “critical thinking and problem solving skills at the operational level of war” amongst Joint All Domain Specialists, as the trainee officers would be called.
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- Technology has changed the face of war. History is witness to perils on the battlefield if scientific advances are overlooked. Battlefields too have changed from physical brawls to cyber and precision strikes.
Conclusion:
Strategic minds at the higher levels of the military and government have a plateful of imperatives to address. This may not be an era of war, as someone famously said recently, but homilies are for politicians and not for professionals. The proverbial powder must not only stay dry but be upgraded in time.
Editorial 2: India’s dilemmas in an Asian century
Introduction:
- If 2022 was a momentous year for India and the rest of the world, 2023 is likely to further sharpen the geopolitical fault lines set in motion by the previous year. Amidst all the tectonic shifts around us, what appears to be a certainty is the emergence of an Asia-centric century. But is that really good news for India?
What is Asian Century:
- The Asian Century refers to the dominant role that Asian nations are expected to play in the 21st century due to their fast-growing economies and youthful demographics.
- Asia's growth is being powered by China and India, two of the biggest global economies, as well as by smaller neighbours including Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Bangladesh.
- By 2030, the world’s 10 biggest economies will be made up largely of today's current emerging markets, according to global bank Standard Chartered.
Rise of Asia:
- The geopolitical and economic rise of Asia coincides with several regional and global developments which have the potential to undermine the stability and prosperity India had hoped an Asian century would bring.
- The withdrawal of the U.S. from much of continental Asia and the aggressive rise of China and the Ukraine war appear to have ended the great power concert in Asia, or what appeared as one for some time.
- Today, two major powers — Russia and China — are trying, though in varying degrees, to undermine the global balance of power, with several regional powers such as Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in tow. Asia may be headed towards more global prominence, but instability will be its possessive partner.
Asian century and (multi)polarity
- There can be no meaningful Asian century in a unipolar world. One alternative to a unipolar world is a multipolar world with Russia, China, Japan, India and other, smaller powers asserting themselves on the global stage. The other alternative is a China-dominated Asia.
- For India, the rise of the Asian century might turn out to be too steeped in harsh realpolitik for its comfort. A deeply status quoist, risk-averse New Delhi is inherently opposed to playing high-risk games of chicken that cross its own self-defined red lines. New Delhi might speak like a revisionist power, but is it prepared to deal with the harsh headwinds of the geopolitical contestations of an Asian century?
The challenge for India:
- Herein lies the challenge for India. It is clear that a China-dominated Asia won’t serve India’s geopolitical interests. Would a multipolar Asia be useful to Indian interests? Not necessarily either.
- A multipolar world/Asia with new and shifting alliances; formal, informal, secret, open and in-between pacts; and competing coalitions vying for dominance will invariably take away from the relative ‘stability’ of the current world order where the power of the U.S. is on the decline and that of China is (still) on the rise.
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In the words of former Indian foreign secretary H.V. Shringla in 2021, “India values a multipolar international order, underpinned by international law, premised upon respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, resolution of international disputes through peaceful negotiations, and free and open access for all to the global commons”.
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- For India, multipolarity is one premised on the rule of law or peaceful coexistence. If anything, a multipolar world led by Asian powers for the most part is likely to be the opposite of what Mr. Shringla outlined.
- One of the likely implications of a multipolar world in which Asia takes the centre stage would be a sharpening of opposition against the current global financial order. The weaponisation of globalisation and trade, sanctions against Russia, and Russia’s attempts in turn at evading them with help from its Asian partners (China, Iran, Turkey, India, etc.) will pose serious challenges to dollar-based trade and Western payment systems such as SWIFT.
- The aftermath of the Ukraine war has led to a serious search in parts of Asia for alternative trading arrangements and payment mechanisms. India may have issues with dollar-based trade, but would it like trading arrangements centred around Yuan?
Delhi’s dilemmas
- New Delhi has consistently campaigned for a multipolar world where key Asian powers have a place at the high table of international politics. Yet it may hesitate to engage the emergent Asian century for various reasons.
- Indian establishment has a deeply status quoist view of the world order despite its frequent calls for change. While it believes in a more democratic, orderly and rules-based world order, it recognises that major systemic changes could also be accompanied by chaos. New Delhi, therefore, likes slow, peaceful and consensual transformation of the system which is not what is happening today.
- New Delhi’s biggest fear would be an Asian century without stable multipolarity. Even if it emerges, a multipolar world is most likely going to be a passing phenomenon, to be soon replaced by a bipolar world dominated by the U.S. and China with the others bandwagoning, balancing and hedging. For India, a bipolar international system dominated by China and the U.S. is a bad deal. If such a world leads to bipolar rivalry, India, being a next-door adversary of China, could often be the target of Chinese ire.
- If a bipolar world leads to great power accommodation between the U.S. and China, India’s situation could be worse off. If the U.S. accommodates China as a peer, it could mean the U.S. accepting China’s sphere of influence. This could make India a casualty at the altar of great power politics. Put differently, whether the U.S. and China compete or accommodate each other in a bipolar world, India has reasons to worry.
- But how real is the emergence of a China-U.S.bipolarity? The more the Ukraine war goes on, the more the U.S./West could attempt to choreograph a working relationship with China. That China has not gone all out in support of Russia’s war efforts could encourage the West/U.S. to do precisely that. For China, an American offer of accommodation in a bipolar format outweighs the utility of a closer strategic partnership with an embattled Russia.
Post-Indian South Asia
- Finally, there is little doubt that an Asian century will be a China-dominated one. China’s growing material power – both economic and military – is already paving the way for it, especially with the U.S.’s focus firmly entrenched in the Russia-Ukraine theatre.
- As far as our neighbourhood is concerned, we may be looking at a ‘post-Indian South Asia’ in the not-so-distant future, tucked away in the Chinese sphere of influence, though not entirely inimical to Indian interests.
Conclusion:
Navigating the emergent Asian century is not going to be easy for New Delhi, but being cognisant of its many vagaries is perhaps a good start. India will need to brace for the Asian Century.