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Editorial 1: Criminalising wilful environmental damage is harder than it sounds

Context

  • While many countries are mulling incorporating ecocide into their respective legal frameworks, debate continues on how it can be criminalised, identifying the burden of proof, and – especially in India – how it will sit with other laws that keep the door open for environmental harm on various grounds.

 

Defining Eocide and Ecocide

  • Ecocide, derived from Greek and Latin, translates to “killing one’s home” or “environment”.
  • Such ‘killing’ could include port expansion projects that destroy fragile marine life and local livelihoods; deforestation; illegal sand-mining; and polluting rivers with untreated sewage.
  • Ecocide constitutes the unlawful or wanton acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.

 

Ecocide – A crime

  • Ecocide is a crime in 11 countries, with 27 others considering laws to criminalise environmental damage that is wilfully caused and harms humans, animals, and plants.
  • The European Parliament voted unanimously this year to enshrine ecocide in law.
  • Most national definitions penalise “mass destruction of flora and fauna”, “poisoning the atmosphere or water resources” or “deliberate actions capable of causing an ecological disaster.
  • None of the existing international criminal laws protect the environment as an end in itself, and that’s what the crime of ecocide does.
  • The movement also responds to harsh climate realities. Over a third of the earth’s animal and plant species could be extinct by 2050. Unprecedented heat waves have broken records worldwide. Changing rainfall schemes have disrupted flood and drought patterns.

 

The purpose

  • The purpose of ecocide laws is to define the “significant harm” of environmental damage, together with accountability and liability.
  • Deforestation of the Amazon, deep-sea trawling or even the catastrophic 1984 Bhopal gas disaster could have been avoided with ecocide laws in place, according to Stop Ecocide International.
  • These laws could also hold individuals at the helms of corporations accountable.
  • That something is morally questionable usually doesn’t hinder investment.
  • Laws provide boundaries and sanctions for investment, as no company or organisation – such as the World Bank – would want to invest in something potentially criminal.
  • Ecocide laws could also double up as calls for justice for low- and middle-income countries disproportionately affected by climate change.

 

India’s stance

  • Some Indian judgments have affirmed the legal personhood of nature by recognising rivers as legal entities with the right to maintain their spirit, identity, and integrity.
  • More importantly, some others have used the term ‘ecocide’ in passing but the concept hasn’t fully materialised in law.
  • India’s legislative framework vis-à-vis environmental and ecological governance includes the Environmental (Protection) Act 1986, the Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972, and the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act (CAMPA) 2016, as well as separate Rules to prevent air and water pollution.
  • According to Prof. Siddiqui, these separate laws have to be consolidated into a unified code and institutions have to be streamlined so that debates like the one about ecocide and rights of nature find “their proper way through legal channels.
  • Notably, the National Green Tribunal, India’s apex environmental statutory body, does not have the jurisdiction to hear matters related to the Wildlife (Protection) Act 1972, the Indian Forest Act 1927, and other State-enacted laws.
  • As a result, mining of sand on the banks of the Chambal river or the Himachal floods would qualify as being environmental crimes under the current articulation

 

Way forward

  • Even before ecocide laws come up internationally, India needs to first bring its [environmental] laws in tune with the idea of ecocide.

Editorial 2: The various strategies of vaccine diplomacy

 

Introduction

  • Traditionally, Western powers have been the major donors of health aid while non-western nations have been the recipients. Aid of this kind has been a part of a country’s diplomatic toolkit, to be deployed judiciously in pursuit of geopolitical goals. During the Cold War, for instance, the two big powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, both developed and delivered vaccines against small pox and polio, in what came to be known as ‘vaccine diplomacy’.

 

Vaccine diplomacy

  • During the COVID-19 pandemic, for the first time in history, three non-Western powers — Russia, China and India — dominated international vaccine diplomacy.
  • These countries, which had long been recipients of health aid, finally made their debut on the world stage as vaccine inventors.
  • Not only were they more proactive than Western powers in distributing vaccines to emerging markets, they did so at a time that was remarkable for two reasons — one, many countries were in desperate need of vaccines; and two, Western nations were hoarding vaccines.
  • This provided an opening for non-Western powers to step in.
  • Countries with an advantage in vaccine R&D would be more open to technology transfer; countries with greater manufacturing capability would be more likely to keep vaccine production within their borders than outsourcing it overseas; and countries with expansive distribution networks would prefer bilateral to multilateral distribution.

 

India’s massive donations

  • As for India, the paper notes that the country was producing 60% of the world’s vaccines even before the pandemic.
  • So India’s vaccine diplomacy was characterised by mass-production of Western-invented vaccines, prompt bilateral donations, and large-scale sales to bilateral buyers and multilateral COVAX initiative.
  • The “Western-invented” Covishield was the major currency of India’s vaccine diplomacy, as it leveraged the massive capacity of SII, the world’s largest vaccine producer.
  • India quickly rolled out large scale bilateral programs called ‘Vacciner Maitri’ (Vaccine Friendship).
  • With more than 90 countries swiftly approaching India, neighbouring countries got priority access to India’s donations.
  • One of India’s largest donations was to Nepal (1.1 million doses), where India and China are competing over influence.
  • Myanmar, which also shares a border with both India and China, was another big beneficiary of India’s vaccine diplomacy.
  • The paper notes two broad patterns in India’s vaccine diplomacy: a ‘neighbourhood first’ policy, and a preference for a range of Caribbean and African states with sizeable populations of Indian diaspora.
  • But geopolitical interest was not India’s only consideration. Also important was the need to cover the cost of manufacturing.
  • So, the sales versus donation conundrum was resolved. Thus India concentrated donations on countries with which it has strong geopolitical and economic ties, but it sold a much larger sum to relatively wealthy countries beyond its geopolitical reach.
  • India’s vaccine diplomacy, however, was interrupted by the second wave of COVID-19, which hit India in early April 2021.
  • Facing skyrocketing domestic demand amid spiralling infection rates, India banned all vaccine exports starting mid-April. This provided an opportunity for Chinese manufacturers to step up and fill the gap,

 

Suggestions

  • Governmental support for industry could be a game-changer — both in enhancing vaccine R&D capability and increasing production capacity.
  • Both Russian and Chinese governments poured vast resources into vaccine R&D, but the Indian government did not.
  • Similarly, though China’s vaccine manufacturing capacity was initially moderate, the government poured in resources to help vaccine developers expand production and backed their marketing strategies abroad.  In contrast, in India, SII and Bharat Biotech had to finance their own production without support from the Indian government.
  •  It was only in April 2021, amid the Delta wave, that the Indian government agreed to provide $600 million to these two companies to expand production

 

Conclusion

  • The slow and limited governmental support made it unavoidable for India to delay its promised vaccine delivery to COVAX and bilateral buyers by half a year. This has affected India’s reputation as a reliable vaccine supplier.