Editorial 1: Let’s talk about ‘one candidate, multiple constituencies’
Context
If ‘one person, one vote’ is the core democratic principle for voters, it should be ‘one candidate, one constituency’ for politicians.
Introduction
Ever since the panel for ‘One Nation One Election’ led by the former President of India, Ram Nath Kovind, recommended simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and State Legislative Assemblies, much has been written on its positive and negative aspects, the practical considerations and of course the politics around the subject. Amidst all the political accusations and counter-accusations, another important issue has gone missing from attention. The matter is about one candidate contesting from multiple constituencies (OCMC) for the same office.
The background, the challenges
- The Constitution of India provides for regular elections every five years to the Legislative Assembly and the lower House of Parliament.
- However, the Constitution, other than providing for the Election Commission of India (ECI), has empowered Parliament to regulate the manner of conducting the elections.
Contesting from Multiple Constituencies
- Representation of the People Act 1951: Under the Act, there was no limit on the number of constituencies a candidate could contest — until 1996.
- Before 1996: This resulted in candidates contesting from multiple constituencies, sometimes more than two, winning them and vacating all but one seat, in accordance with Section 70 of the same Act.
- 1996 Amendment: Parliament amended the Act in 1996 to limit the number of constituencies that a candidate can contest from, to two.
- Despite this, the practice has continued. The numbers are even more frequent in State Legislative Assembly elections, leading to frequent by-elections — there were 44 by-elections for State Assemblies in November 2024due to the resignation of sitting legislators.
Challenges Posed by Frequent By-Elections
- Taxpayer costs: The administrative cost of the Lok Sabha elections is borne by the central government, and Legislative Assemblies by the State governments.
- In the 2014 general election, it amounted to ₹3,870 crore.
- Adjusted for 6% annual inflation, the 2024 general election is put at a cost of ₹6,931 crore, or ₹12.76 crore per seat.
- If 10 politicians win from two constituencies, the extra cost of holding a by-election would be around ₹130 crore.
- While this is relatively small when compared to overall election spending, the real issue lies in the massive expenditure by political parties, estimated at ₹1,35,000 crore for the recent general election, or about ₹250 crore per constituency, according to the estimates by the Centre for Media Studies.
- This burden ultimately falls on the public, and much of the funding comes from black money, which undermines financial transparency.
- Favoring the ruling party: The by-election necessitated by the vacation of a winning candidate within an initial six months tends to favour the ruling party.
- This is borne out in by-election trends across multiple States.
- The ruling party can mobilise resources and provide patronage to party workers, which creates a non-level playing field that is skewed against the Opposition, with negative implications for parliamentary democracy.
- Financial burden on cefeated Candidates and pheir Parties: The financial burden of organising a by-election disproportionately falls on the already defeated candidate and their party, forcing them to spend resources once again.
- Undermining democratic principles: The saying “Democracy is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people” suggests that elections should serve people’s needs.
- However, a candidate contesting from multiple seats serves as a hedging mechanism against uncertainties and often prioritises the leader’s interests, not the people’s.
- This undermines democratic principles, placing politics above the public.
- Violation of Fundamental Rights: OCMC is sometimes used to enhance the reach and message delivery of the leader, relying on their popularity for electoral success.
- This often reflects the leader’s dominance within the party, particularly in family- or leader-centric parties.
- Moreover, OCMC goes against the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression of citizens.
- A petition filed in 2023 (Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay vs Union of India) argued that when people elect a representative, they trust that person to be their voice.
- Contesting multiple constituencies, winning them, and vacating one for a by-election violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
- This practice causes voter confusion and discontent, as seen in Wayanad, Kerala, when Rahul Gandhivacated his seat in 2024, potentially leading to voter apathy.
- The voter turnout was 64.24% in the bypoll and 72.92% in the general election.
Some advantages
- Common Practice: The OCMC is common in many countries and may have some practical considerations.
Practical Considerations of OCMC
- Safety net for candidates: Contesting multiple seats provides a safety net for candidates, especially in tightly contested constituencies.
- Leader-Centric politics: In a polity like India, where politics is centered around the leader and family, OCMC smoothens the leader’s continuation or transition in case a leader-centric party secures a majority but the leader of the party loses out.
- For instance:
- Mamata Banerjee lost the Nandigram seat in the 2021 West Bengal Assembly elections. To make way for her, another leader elected from the Bhabanipur constituency had to resign from the Assembly.
- Similarly, Pushkar Singh Dhami, Chief Minister of Uttarakhand, faced a similar situation in the 2022 Assembly elections.
International experience
- OCMC is not unique to India.
- Pakistan and Bangladesh allow candidates to contest multiple constituencies but require them to relinquish all but one seat.
- Pakistan places no limit on the number of constituencies a candidate can contest, as seen in the 2018 elections when the former Prime Minister contested five seats and vacated four.
- Similarly, Bangladesh allowed candidates to contest up to five constituencies until 2008 but now limits it to three.
- The practice was once common in the United Kingdom but has been banned since 1983.
- Most European democracies have phased it out to promote clear representation and accountability.
Misuse of OCMC and Need for Reform
- The misuse of the OCMC far outweighs the benefits. There have been demands for reforms, and probable solutions may be considered.
Proposed Solutions
- Amend Section 33(7) of the RP Act 1951
- Amend Section 33(7) of the RP Act 1951 to ban one candidate contesting from multiple constituencies for the same office.
- The ECI, in 2004, recommended the government ban the practice.
- The 255th Law Commission report in 2015 made the same recommendation.
- Recovery of By-Election costs: Recover the full cost of by-elections from the candidate vacating a seat to serve as a deterrent against contesting from multiple constituencies.
- The ECI recommended cost imposition on candidates contesting from multiple constituencies in 2004.
- However, the practice of OCMC will continue as the winning candidate or political party can afford to pay the cost.
- Hold By-Elections after a year: A more effective deterrent would be to hold the by-elections after a year, allowing voters ample time to make an informed decision and giving the defeated candidate sufficient time to recover and prepare strategically for another contest.
- This would also provide a more balanced and fair electoral process.
- This could be done by amending Section 151A, Representation of Peoples Act 1951, which provides for by-elections within six months of the occurrence of a vacancy.
Conclusion
Holding elections requires substantial financial resources from the state. Furthermore, with elections being a round-the-year affair in India, the frequent need for by-elections takes time and money — resources that could otherwise be better invested in the country’s development. However, as the issue of OCOC (one candidate, one constituency) is political, it requires political willpower and the support of the major parties to bring about change. However, unlike the One Nation One Election, it does not have many proponents in political parties. If “one person, one vote” is the core democratic principle for voters, it is time to enforce “one candidate, one constituency” for candidates.
Editorial 2: India’s firmer attempts at mineral diplomacy
Context
The moves are to reduce India’s strategic vulnerability, but there are issues that need to be resolved
Introduction
As India seeks to expand its manufacturing and technological capability, critical minerals will become vital to fulfil this ambition. However, India, a major critical mineral importer, still depends on other countries, primarily China, for its mineral security, which has become a cause of strategic concern. Union Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, who voiced India’s apprehensions at a defence think tank gathering, said, “While [the] scramble for resources for economic reasons has had a long history, their weaponisation by some nations for strategic reasons is a comparatively new phenomenon”, hinting at Chinese attempts. To address India’s mineral security challenge, which is aimed at reducing its strategic vulnerability, New Delhi has started an attempt to engage in mineral diplomacy.
Establishing joint ventures
This attempt is based on the pillars of:
- Developing international engagement with mineral-producing countries.
- Establishing strategic partnerships with intergovernmental organisations.
First Pillar: Building Bilateral Ties with Resource-Rich Countries
- The first pillar focuses on building bilateral ties with resource-rich countries such as Australia, Argentina, the United States, Russia, and Kazakhstan to secure the supply of lithium and cobalt.
- To facilitate this vision, post-2019, India established the Khanij Bidesh India Ltd. (KABIL), a joint venture company with a mandate “to ensure a consistent supply of critical and strategic minerals to the Indian domestic market.”
- The objective was to achieve mineral security by securing agreements and acquisitions through government-to-government, government-to-business, and business-to-business routes.
Key Developments and Agreements
- March 2022: KABIL signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Australia for a critical mineral investment partnership, identifying two lithium and three cobalt projects.
- Latin America’s Lithium Triangle (Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia) has attracted India’s attention.
- January 2024: India signed a $24 million lithium exploration pact with a state-owned enterprise in Argentina for five lithium brine blocks.
- KABIL is actively working to secure mineral supplies by facilitating the buying of assets from Bolivia and Chile.
- Private sector involvement: Altmin Private Limited signed an agreement with YLB, Bolivia’s national company, to secure the raw material supply chain of Li-ion batteries.
Second Pillar: Engaging with Central Asia
- Central Asia has also caught India’s attention.
- Recently, India and Kazakhstan formed a joint venture, IREUK Titanium Limited, to produce titanium slag in India. This was one of India’s first joint ventures with the Central Asian Republics.
- This attempt aligns with New Delhi’s proposal to establish an India-Central Asia Rare Earths Forum to leverage the region’s rich resources.
Cooperative engagements
Second Pillar: International Engagement in Mineral Diplomacy
The second pillar of mineral diplomacy is international engagement, which focuses on forging and strengthening partnerships with minilateral and multilateral initiatives related to mineral security. Key initiatives include:
- The Quad (Australia, Japan, India, the United States)
- Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF)
- Mineral Security Partnership (MSP)
- G-7
These initiatives aim for cooperation in the critical mineral supply chain, aligning India with global best practices in the critical mineral sector across its three segments — upstream, midstream, and downstream.
Key Benefits of International Engagement
- Knowledge sharing and capacity building: These partnerships also facilitate knowledge sharing and capacity building, which are essential for coordinating with international partners such as the U.S., the European Union (EU), South Korea, and Australia.
Strengthening Collaboration with Western Partners
- To further this collaboration, India’s Ministry of Mines signed a MoU with the International Energy Agency to strengthen cooperation on critical minerals.
- This collaboration helps India to streamline its policies, regulations, and investment strategies in the critical mineral sector, aligning them with global standards and best practices.
The missing pieces
India’s attempt at mineral diplomacy has led to many positive outcomes but still lacks three essential ingredients required for its international diplomatic engagement:
- Lack of Private Sector Participation
- Weak Diplomatic Capacity
- Insufficient Sustainable Partnerships
Reasons for Lack of Private Sector Participation
- Absence of a Critical Mineral Supply Chain etrategy: The absence of a strategy and a clear road map for the private sector are primary reasons for the lack of policy clarity, which has led to their absence.
- Need for a Comprehensive Approach: India needs to formulate a comprehensive approach for de-risking, considering the role of the private sector across the supply chain. This strategy should align with India’s growth prospects and national security priorities.
Strengthening Diplomatic Capacity
- Strengthening Engagement: India must strengthen its mineral diplomacy engagement. An important step could be to establish:
- A dedicated mineral diplomacy division within the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), similar to the New and Emerging Strategic Technologies (NEST) division.
- A special position for mineral diplomacy in selected diplomatic missions.
Building Sustainable Partnerships
- Strategic and Sustainable Partnerships: India’s goal towards mineral security requires forging strategic, sustainable, and trusted partnerships with bilateral partners and multilateral forums.
- Key Partners: Among all its partners, working with EU, South Korea, and the other Quad members is critical to India’s mineral security due to their domestic capabilities, diplomatic network, and technological know-how.
- Complementing India’s strategy: If these issues can be resolved, India’s attempts at mineral diplomacy will gain strength and will be able to better complement New Delhi’s domestic critical mineral initiatives, which are currently moving at a slow pace.
Conclusion
Resolving issues related to private sector participation, diplomatic capacity, and sustainable partnerships will strengthen India’s mineral diplomacy. This will enhance coordination between international and domestic efforts, ensuring a more secure and effective mineral supply chain, ultimately reducing strategic vulnerabilities and supporting India’s growth ambitions.