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Topic 1 : Dangerous status quo: On continuing hostilities in Manipur

Context: Unless non-state actors are demilitarised in Manipur, hostilities in the State will persist.

Introduction

  • Eight months after ethnic violence broke out between the largely valley-dwelling Meitei and the hill-dwelling Kuki-Zo communities in Manipur, hostilities continue.
  • The ethnic polarisation has persisted and displaced people on both sides are still unable to return to their homes; schooling and health care remain disrupted and the writ of the State government does not run in the Kuki-Zo hill areas.

 

Organizational inabilities

  • The government’s inability to win peace and the failure of institutions such as the State Assembly to deliberate on the problem have compounded the conflict even as the Chief Minister, N. Biren Singh, continues to be seen more as an ethnic leader, preventing the possibility of any thaw in the pervasive hostility.
  • Even media and civil society organisations seem to be divided on ethnic lines and, more dangerously, the role of the army and central paramilitary forces is being seen through this lens, evident in the utterances of the Chief Minister and representatives of ethnic chauvinist groups.

 

Government’s response

  • The Union government’s response has been to rely on a smoke and mirrors approach — a de facto assumption of powers related to law and order enforcement without publicly announcing the imposition of Article 355 that enables it to do so.
  • There has been little follow-up on confidence-building measures between the representatives of the ethnic groups after visits by the Union Home Minister Amit Shah and others from his Ministry.
  • The latest visit by a Home Ministry team is a reaction to a resolution by some MLAs to take collective action following fresh killings and violence in Moreh town.

 

Militarized area

  • The predominance of militant outfits is alarming. Militias such as the Meitei radical Arambai Tenggol have been allowed to act as “defence squads”, brandishing weapons and being allowed to vitiate the already perilous discourse in the valley even as Kuki insurgents do the same in the hill areas.
  • The arms looted from police stations and camps have still to be recovered, which suggests that there is a dangerous militarisation of non-state groups.
  • The Union government must focus on addressing this key issue on either side of the divide. Meanwhile, Mr. Singh has tried to erroneously link the prevailing conflict and the ethnic polarisation to the refugee situation in Manipur with many, predominantly from the Chin communities, fleeing the civil war in Myanmar following attacks by the junta.
  • This has led to the demand for ending the Free Movement Regime (FMR) enabling trade and people-to-people contact near the border.

 

Conclusion

  • While the porous border has also enabled drug trafficking and the movement of insurgents, a cessation of the FMR would be a case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

Topic 2 : Choppy waters: On India-Maldives ties 

Context: India and the Maldives must persist with quiet diplomacy to reset ties

Introduction

  • Within weeks of the India-Maldives showdown over derogatory remarks by Maldivian Ministers and the call for Indian tourists to boycott the archipelago, as well as the tussle over Indian troops stationed in Maldives, Delhi and Male are dealing with another controversy.
  • This time it is over the Chinese “research” ship Xiang Yang Hong 03, that is expected to dock in Male in February.

India-Maldives relations

  • Over time, the geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors have shaped the relationship between India and the Maldives.
  • Early Diplomatic Relationships, 1965–1978: Following their 1965 declaration of independence from the British, the Maldives developed diplomatic ties with India.
  • One of the first nations to acknowledge the Maldives' independence was India.
  • Strategic Partnership (1978–1988): The two nations' maritime borders were defined in part by the 1979 signing of the Maritime Boundary Agreement.
  • Political Unrest from 1988 to 2008: When Indian forces intervened in Operation Cactus in 1988 following a coup attempt in the Maldives, the relationship was put under strain.
  • The goal of India's military intervention was to stop the coup and maintain the political stability of the Maldives.
  • Normalization and Economic Cooperation (2008–2013): Mohamed Nasheed was sworn in as president of the Maldives in 2008 following a smooth political changeover.
  • With an emphasis on trade, people-to-people connections, and economic cooperation, the relationship between India and the Maldives improved.  India helped the Maldives develop, especially with infrastructure and capacity building projects.
  • Period of Strain (2013–2018): Under Abdulla Yameen's presidency, there were strains in the relationship due to worries about human rights, democratic regression, and what was seen as a perceived shift in favor of China.
  • India has strategic concerns about the Maldives' increasing involvement with China, particularly the infrastructure projects they are undertaking as part of the Belt and Road Initiative.
  • Renewed Engagement (From 2018 Onward): The Maldives' 2018 presidential election of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih signalled a change in the country's bilateral relations. A fresh focus was placed on fortifying relations with India.
  • Both nations reaffirmed their dedication to democratic principles, and India offered funding for a range of development initiatives.

 

 

India’s concerns

  • India has made its concerns over Chinese ships in the Indian Ocean clear. After objecting to visits by Chinese “research” vessels to Sri Lanka, New Delhi managed to ensure that Colombo banned, from 2024, all foreign research ships, that are believed to collect data for military and civilian purposes, from docking there.
  • For New Delhi, the welcome mat for Chinese ships, at a time the new government of President Muizzu has scrapped the India-Maldives hydrography agreement, has played out as a rebuff.
  • Male also welcomed a visit by the commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, who presented equipment.
  • That the developments follow other setbacks, beginning with Mr. Muizzu’s electoral win last year after he ran with an “India Out” campaign slogan, his government’s plans to push out Indian personnel and his decision to prioritise visits to Türkiye, the UAE and China have made it more worrying.

Engagement important

  • It is significant that despite Male’s pushback and hyper nationalist calls within India, New Delhi has not stopped engaging the Muizzu government.
  • Prime Minister of India met Mr. Muizzu in December and set up a high-level core group for bilateral negotiations on tricky issues. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also met with his Maldivian counterpart last week.
  • It is hoped that both sides realise that their tensions are merely symptoms of problems that could get larger: one, a regional power that aspires to be a global power, and the other, an archipelago dependent for its economic and regional security needs on external forces.
  • While sovereignty is paramount for any country, it is important that the two sides see the benefit of a détente over confrontation.
  • For India, whose neighbourhood first policy focuses on helping according to its neighbour’s priorities, it is ungainly to be seen as foisting its military, that has carried out humanitarian operations, on the Maldives.
  • For the Muizzu government, that just lost a significant election for Male mayor, the impact of the animus with India on upcoming Majlis (parliamentary) elections should also be a worry.

 

Conclusion

  • In that sense, the Maldives decision to invite the Xiang Yang Hong 03, but not to allow it more than a routine port call is hopefully a sign that quiet diplomacy is working. A rational approach is more likely to shore troubled bilateral ties out of the choppy waters now.