Topic 1 : A less ableist politics
Introduction: On December 21, the Election Commission of India released an advisory for political parties to follow disability-sensitive terminologies.
More about guidelines
- The 11 guidelines can broadly be put into three categories: Disability-inclusive communication by political parties and their members, accessibility of information, and inclusion within party frameworks.
- The guidelines on communication relate to the usage of ill-health terminologies for persons with disabilities (PwD), dehumanising or using PwDs to depict incapacity or perpetuate stereotypes.
- The guidelines around accessibility relate to information accessibility on political party websites and holding events at accessible places.
- The third head provides for the development of training modules on disability for party workers and endeavours to include PwDs at all levels of a political party.
Need for such guidelines
- Recent instances have underlined the need for these guidelines.
- For example, in September 2023, a leader from Tamil Nadu compared Sanatan Dharma to people with leprosy and HIV in a derogatory manner.
- National leaders have also used disability in a demeaning manner, especially during election speeches.
- Such instances dehumanise PwDs and perpetuate stereotypes, resulting in an “attitudinal barrier” under the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016.
- Political inclusion is an ignored aspect within the Indian realm of disability.
Limitations of these guidelines and corrective measures
Although these guidelines are a reformative step in that direction, an effective strategy is still required.
1.Most of the Guidelines are advisory in nature
- These guidelines are only an “advisory”, though the phraseology of a few guidelines is in mandatory language.
- For instance, guidelines under the disability-inclusive communication head use words like “should” and “shall” before and after the instructions.
- However, other guidelines, especially under the inclusion within the political party framework, are still incorporated in discretionary terms, for example, using “may.” A uniform mandate under all three heads is needed.
2. Guidelines are not a part of MCC
- It is understood that these guidelines are still not part of the Model Code of Conduct.
- The advisory mentions that the breach of guidelines related to disability-inclusive communication would make political parties and their members prone to action under section 92 of the RPwD Act.
- It’s unclear whether a breach of other guidelines will also invoke this provision.
- Section 92 is a punishment provision for atrocities against PwDs.
- These guidelines must be given teeth by including them within the MCC on the lines of gender guidelines.
3. Ambiguity in the usage of specific phraseology
- There is some ambiguity within the guidelines with respect to the usage of specific phraseology.
- For instance, it cites words like “blind”, “deaf” and “dumb” as examples of wrong terminologies.
- Although their translation in Hindi or another language might be derogatory, these are technical words to refer to people with visual, hearing, and speech disability.
- A detailed list of disability-sensitive words and phraseology under the UN Disability Inclusion Strategy can guide the ECI.
4. No strong push for the inclusion of PwDs in party functionaries
- The draft National Policy for PwD released last year for public consultation didn’t have any chapter on political inclusion.
- The ECI advisory says that “political parties must endeavour to include PwD at all levels as members and party workers”.
- It also prescribes adherence to accessibility norms by political parties, which are the first instance of access to political space for PwD.
- As these guidelines are expected to catalyze the political inclusion of PwD, a chapter on political inclusion in the national policy should be incorporated.
- This will align with the principles of Article 29 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
5. No strong data on PwDs’ presence in political offices
- We still have no data on the number of legislators with disabilities.
- The ECI still doesn’t have any column on disability in the nomination forms and affidavits filed by contestants during elections.
- The lack of data has contributed significantly to the political exclusion of PwDs.
Conclusion: It is hoped that the ECI will also correct this anomaly. The 2024 elections are an opportunity to address this lack. It can be the second step towards the political inclusion of PwD.
Topic 2 : A note to security planners
Introduction: The last two years are too recent to be consigned to “history” but some of the most significant punctuations of 2022 and 2023 in the strategic domain could be extrapolated to the composite Indian national security challenge in the year ahead.
The eventful two years and learning from these events
The events of 2022
- Ended the long-term belief that in the post-Cold War world order nations would not go to war for territory gains.
- Nuclear-armed nations will not go for conventional warfare.
- There will be a total disregard for the agreements signed in the past.
- The two biggest examples of this are the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Galwan clash between India and China.
The events of 2023
- Hamas's terror attack on Israel and Israel’s brutal reprisal brought back the Israel-Palestine issue to the forefront of global concerns.
- It also showed the world how non-state actors are evolving with their techniques.
- The surprise attack of Hamas and the low-cost attack of Houthis rebels on the ships in the Red Sea are examples of non-state actors' low-cost capability of creating a nuisance in the future.
The learnings from these events for India
- In alluding to the rhythms of history, the strand to be highlighted is how the target of each attack (Ukraine, Israel or merchant shipping) was caught by surprise, revealing the inadequacy of both actionable intelligence at the tactical level and the ability at a higher planning level to anticipate out-of-the-box security exigencies based on technological trends.
- India has a patchy track record in this regard. The October 1962 border war with China, Kargil in 1999, the Mumbai terror attack of 2008 and most recently Galwan in 2020 are cases in point.
- The surprise element left Indian apex security planners (cabinet committee on security) and the operational force commanders bewildered, and more often than not an arduous reactive response was mounted to overcome the setback.
India’s security challenge in 2024
1. The two-front challenge for India
- India enters 2024 with a complex set of security challenges, both on the external front and the LIC-IS (low-intensity conflict – internal security) domain.
- The security postures of China and Pakistan individually and the strategic cooperation between them, as well as their support to non-state entities, is an abiding challenge for Delhi.
2. The spillover of Israel-Hamas conflict into India
- Furthermore, the probability that the current Hamas-Houthi churn could embolden groups in the Subcontinent to advance their anti-India agenda remains high.
- The spike in terrorist violence in Jammu is illustrative.
3. The changing dynamics of India’s neighbours
- Recent developments in Myanmar and their spillover into the Indian northeast and the pro-China orientation in the politics of the Maldives could unspool in a manner that is inimical to Indian interests.
- Concurrently, the electoral dynamic in Pakistan has the potential to unleash dormant anti-Indian fervour.
4. Military preparedness
- India’s overall security index will remain relatively parlous in 2024 due to a combination of factors that include electoral compulsions in the early part of the year where rhetoric may be removed from reality and the funding constraints that have hobbled the much-needed induction of platforms and modernisation of old inventory.
- It merits recall that after the Khanduri report was tabled in Parliament in March 2018, there has been no objective review of the status of India’s military preparedness.
- Rhetorical assertions are periodically made about the capability of the Indian military, but these are not borne out in the bean counting of tangible combat assets.
5. Structural changes in Armed Forces and its impact on stability of forces
- The more serious challenge is that institutionally, the Indian fauj is going through a radical re-wiring both at the apex, by way of the intent to move towards theatre commands, and at the bottom of the pyramid because of the pattern of recruitment.
- Appointing a retired three-star officer as the second CDS was a radical decision by the Narendra Modi government that has dented the apolitical nature of the armed forces.
- Its impact on the combat efficiency of the military and the higher defence management remains indeterminate at this stage.
- The more significant policy shift has been the introduction of the Agniveer scheme for young recruits — this has resurrected many of the misgivings that were earlier voiced after the excerpts of former army chief General M M Naravane’s memoir were made public.
- The impact on the Gorkha regiments could reduce the combat level of the army in the long run.
6. Induction of new age technology into defence forces
- Perhaps the most difficult challenge for security planners worldwide will be to study the tea leaves of 2023, which are yet to settle, and arrive at an informed decision about further acquisitions of conventional platforms (tanks, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft) and determine their efficacy/vulnerability in the emerging battlefield environment.
- This will be further modified with the gradual introduction of AI and related technologies.
- Security planners will have to factor in exigencies that go beyond traditional conflict scenarios, wherein states may be pitted against opaque non-state entities and their hidden support structures that could include market forces and shady corporate power brokers.
Conclusion: The rhymes of history may chime at a quicker pace than envisaged and the security challenges for India in 2024 and beyond will test the nimbleness and bench strength of the next government and the higher defence management team.