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Editorial 1: The wages of cynicism

Recent Context:

  • It is a measure of the cynicism and complacency that marks world politics that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is fading away from global consciousness as just another fact of life, obscuring the human costs and the risks of the conflict.
  • The initial reaction to the attack was panic. Could this escalate into a wider war, or worse still, into a nuclear confrontation? It was feared that the implications for the global economy might be catastrophic. And there was some concern for the fate of Ukraine itself.

 

Role of NATO during the situation:

  • A year after the invasion, there is marked complacency about the risks of escalation. The NATO strategy was to arm Ukraine to defend itself but avoid a direct military confrontation with Russia.
  •  It was to try and make sure the war did not spill over to a wider geography, and that a combination of western unity and economic sanctions would be the means to pressure, if not cripple Russia.
  •  NATO calibrated its military support to achieve these objectives. A year later there seems to be growing confidence that this fine line between supporting Ukraine and directly confronting Russia can be maintained.
  •  But as with all security threats, the line may be in the eye of the beholder. It is not an achievement one can take for granted

 

Continuation of War further deteriorate the situation:

  • The biggest surprise in the months following the invasion was the heroism of the Ukrainian resistance against Russian forces.
  •  In some ways that resistance was an extraordinary achievement. It at once exposed the brittleness of Russia’s military power.
  •  But as the war enters its second year there is now a greater risk that it could be even more brutal and its humanitarian costs catastrophic. The Ukrainian resistance was enough to push back the invasion.
  • But it is not entirely clear that it will be militarily in a position to declare total victory by reclaiming Crimea and Donbas. In the meantime, what is becoming clear is that Russia has also redoubled its resolve despite catastrophic losses in the first year.
  • It escalated by calling for a general mobilisation. But perhaps even more ominously, it could increase the destructive power of this war even further by escalating missile strikes and targeting civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. 

Spill over effect of Russia-Ukraine War

  • The initial uncertainty over the larger economic fallout of the war has subsided. It is now seen as nothing more than a temporary shock. It was aided by a warm winter; Europe readjusted its energy supplies.
  • Predictions about catastrophic inflation did not come to pass. What the war did was unleash a new round of opportunism around the world that reoriented energy flows, created new currency swap arrangements, realigned future defence production.
  •  But it also turned out that economic sanctions were a feeble tool against Russia.
    • As the historian of economic sanctions, Nicholas Mulder, pointed out, Russia’s economy shrank but far less than the world had expected.
    •  Thanks to much of the world outside of the West and some deft management, Russia can sustain an economy where the effect of sanctions on its population is not catastrophic, and at least a destructive war can be waged.
  • The really challenging question will be whether Ukraine’s economy will be easy to sustain if Russia’s will to destruction continues.

 

Does the war lead to preservation of the liberal world order or a conflict between autocracy and democracy. 

  • One of the tragedies of the war is that for most of the world, Ukraine remains the sideshow, collateral damage in that inevitable drama of great power competition.
  • There is good reason to be cynical about framing this conflict in excessively moralistic overtones like the preservation of the liberal world order or a conflict between autocracy and democracy.
  • If anything, the war has tied the US hands even more in acting as a policeman of liberal values. It has given its friends and allies like India and Israel even more cover to renege on their democratic promise, without attracting any international attention.
  • For most of the world, the war became an occasion for Schadenfreude about American power. It was viewed as a consequence of America’s hubris in not accommodating Russia’s security concerns. We can endlessly debate the matter. Or else, the recent history of American interventions made the Russian intervention just another one of those bad things all great powers do.

 

Consequences of Russian war on global politics

  • It is probably the first time since World War II (with the possible exception of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), that the object of an invasion was not simply to brutally annex territory or produce regime change, but to obliterate the existence of a whole country.
  • In this sense, the Russian invasion was not just a rerun of great power completion, it set a whole new norm. But this fact and the tragedy of Ukraine became a sideshow for the rest of the world.
  • The Ukraine war emerged out of a combination of four things.
    •  A great power rivalry in which Russia felt the US had not accommodated its security concerns and was encircling it;
    • traditional territorial claims;
    •  the confidence on Russia’s part that it could win, but if not,
    • at least America was not in a position to make its writ run on the world, and  an authoritarian figure determined to leave his mark on history.

 

Conclusion:

  • Such incidents further escalate the smililar issues in the ither parts of the world such as China’s long-standing historical and territorial claims over Taiwan remain a potent ideological factor. And China also has a leader determined to leave his historical legacy.
  •  The casualty of the cynicism and complacency that the Ukraine war has produced is that not only will the unfolding catastrophe in Ukraine become invisible, the world might also sleepwalk into another war, by trying to be too clever by half.
  • And such historical events of wars puts threat to global peace and prosperity  and under the role of Global grouping organisation which aims to provide peace to the world.

Editorial 2: Eknath Shinde-led Sena faction gets ‘bow and arrow’ symbol: How did Election Commission decide who gets party symbol?

Recent Context:

  • Recently, The Election Commission of India (ECI) ordered that the Eknath Shinde camp of the Shiv Sena will retain the official name and the ‘bow and arrow’ symbol of the party
  • Meanwhile, the Uddhav Thackeray-led faction will retain the interim party name Shiv Sena UBT and the flaming torch as its poll symbol

 

 How does EC decide who gets the symbol?

  • On the question of a split in a political party outside the legislature, Para 15 of the Symbols Order, 1968, states:
    • “When the Commission is satisfied…that there are rival sections or groups of a recognised political party each of whom claims to be that party the Commission may, after taking into account all the available facts and circumstances of the case and hearing (their) representatives…decide that one such rival section or group or none of such rival sections or groups is that recognised political party and the decision of the Commission shall be binding on all such rival sections or groups.”
  • This applies to disputes in recognised national and state parties (like the Shiv Sena). For splits in registered but unrecognised parties, the ECI usually advises the warring factions to resolve their differences internally or to approach the court.
  • The first case to be decided under the 1968 Order was the first split in the Indian National Congress in 1969. After the party old guard led by K Kamaraj, Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, S Nijalingappa, and Atulya Ghosh, known as the Syndicate, expelled Indira Gandhi from the Congress, and the party split into the “old” Congress (O) led by Nijalingappa and the “new” Congress (J) led by Indira.
    • The “old” Congress retained the party symbol of a pair of bullocks carrying a yoke; the breakaway faction was given the symbol of a cow with its calf.

 

Is there a way other than the test of majority to resolve a symbol dispute?

  • In almost all such disputes so far, a clear majority of party delegates/office bearers, MPs and MLAs have supported one of the factions. In the case of the Shiv Sena, the majority of the party’s elected representatives switched over to Shinde’s side
  • Whenever the ECI could not test the strength of rival groups based on support within the party organisation (because of disputes regarding the list of office bearers), it has sought to fall back on testing the majority only among elected MPs and MLAs.

 

What happens to the group that doesn’t get the parent party’s symbol?

  • In the case of the first Congress split, the ECI recognised both the Congress (O) and the breakaway faction whose president was Jagjivan Ram.
  • The Congress (O) had a substantial presence in some states and satisfied the criteria fixed for recognition of parties under Paras 6 and 7 of the Symbols Order.
  • This principle was followed up to 1997. However, things changed when the ECI dealt with the splits in the Congress, Janata Dal, etc.
  • The ECI felt that merely having MPs and MLAs is not enough, as the elected representatives had fought and won polls on tickets of their parent (undivided) parties.
  •  It introduced a new rule under which the splinter group  other than the group that got the symbol  had to register itself as a separate party and could lay claim to national or state party status only on the basis of its performance in state or central elections after registration.

 

 

Powers and Functions of Election Commission of India:

  • Demarcation of Constituencies:
  • To prepare for identification the up-to-date list of all the persons who are entitle for voting at the poll.
  • Recognition of Political Parties and Allotment of Symbols:
    • Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1951 on registration of political parties. Section 29 A now inserted provides for registration with the Commission, of associations and bodies of individual citizens of India as political parties for purpose of this Act.
      • A recognised political party has been classified either as a National Party or a State Party under paragraph 7 of the Elections Symbol Order, 1968
  • Quasi-Judicial Powers
    • It acts as a court for settling disputes related to granting of recognition to political parties and allotment of election symbols to them.
    • To appoint officers for inquiring into disputes relating to electoral arrangements.
    • It defines a model code of conduct for all political parties and candidates and ensures they adhere to it during election season.
    • Election Expenses: Election Commission has perform is to scrutinise the accounts of election expenses submitted by contestants in elections.
  • Advisory Powers:
    • It advises the president on matters relating to the disqualifications of the members of Parliament.
    • It advises the governor on matters relating to the disqualifications of the members of state legislature.
    • It advises the president whether elections can be held in a state under president’s rule in order to extend the period of emergency after one year