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Editorial 1 : Humanity’s law

Introduction: The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor has thrown down the gauntlet by seeking arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and three Hamas leaders, including Yahya Sinwar.

 

There is Good Reason to be Cynical of the ICC

  • Accusations of Selective Attention: The ICC has been criticized for focusing on certain cases while ignoring others.
  • Lack of Enforcement: Many ICC rulings are not enforced, even by its own member states.
  • Great Power Exceptionalism: Three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, and the United States) are not ICC members.
  • Questionable Legitimacy: The ICC's legitimacy is often questioned, with signatories concerned it may be used to control smaller nations and dictators.
  • Counterproductive Juridification: There is a concern that legal proceedings in political conflicts can hinder compromise and escalate tensions.
  • Ambiguous Legal Routes: The ICC may avoid action by exploiting legal ambiguities over jurisdiction, despite strong cases presented by prosecutors.

 

The ICC Prosecutor Seeking Arrest Warrants: Significance and Implications

1. It damages Israel’s reputation

  • First, the seeking of an arrest warrant against Netanyahu is a blow to Israel’s reputation.
  • It has been obvious that Israel’s military operations in Gaza are a humanitarian catastrophe, if not genocide, as Aryeh Neier has recently argued in The New York Review of Books.
  • It is arguing, a little incredulously, that the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths in this war is lower than for most wars in the 20th century.
  • The warrant does not take a stand on the sources of this conflict.
  • It does accuse Israel of deliberately starving civilians, and both Israel and Hamas of violating the laws of armed conflict.

 

2. USA’s action is challenging its own ‘Liberal International Order’

  • The United States has publicly condemned the ruling, and several prominent senators have, in turn, threatened ICC officials with sanctions.
  • That the United States is tearing up the “liberal international order” is old news.
  • But ignoring the ICC is one thing; having your political class threatening it is a new form of intimidation of international institutions, all the more ironic in light of the fact that the same ICC’s ruling against Putin was welcomed.
  • It is precisely this reaction that makes seeking the arrest warrant more relevant.
  • ICC member states are not only obliged to execute its warrants, they are potentially also obliged to defend the ICC against intimidation.
  • This will put the United States’ allies in a bind.

 

Differences and Implications of ICC vs. ICJ

  • ICC prosecutes individuals, unlike the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
  • Warrants emphasize moral limits in political conflicts.
  • Equating to each other was rejected by both
    • Israel: Resents being equated with Hamas.
    • Hamas: Rejects ignoring the power disparity with Israel.
  • The Israel-Palestine conflict needs a solution, where
    • Palestinian Cause: Needs to distance from Hamas's barbarism.
    • Defense of Israel: Should not justify excessive violence or denial of Palestinian rights.
  • Domestic Impact Desired:
    • Israel: Needs a strategic change.
    • Palestinians: Must move beyond Hamas.
  • International Opinion: Law effectiveness relies on supportive public opinion.

 

Potential Negative Consequences

  • Entrenched Positions: Might harden stances, hindering humanitarian aid and compromise.
  • Global Nihilism: Debate over ICC warrants could increase cynicism about international law.
  • Moral Accountability: ICC highlights that states cannot escape moral scrutiny, revealing the moral bankruptcy of the international order.

 

The ongoing US campus protests

  • When the campus protests were on in the US most students were open to reasonable discussions.
  • But there was, in many sections, an odd discomfort with the language of resistance that had Gandhi and Mandela at its centre.
  • There were common moral refrains underlying both groups: Don’t target people for being who they are; every group is entitled to a life of safety and dignity.
  • The moral intuitions were shared but the empathetic gesture of what existential threats might feel like to the other side was missing.

 

Conclusion: It is a tragedy that Hamas and Israel and all the great powers will unite in their condemnation of the ICC, rather than take seriously the claim that what we need in a world drifting towards catastrophic power politics is “humanity’s law, not the law of any given side.”


Editorial 2 : A time for para diplomacy

Introduction: In its manifesto issued last week, the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) promised to get back Kartarpur Sahib, the final resting place of Guru Nanak, less than five kilometres across the Pakistan border. The SAD is promising to work with the Centre to negotiate an “exchange of territory” with Pakistan, in return for Kartarpur Sahib.

 

The proposal draws more scepticism

  • Sceptics would be quick to dismiss these ideas: Changing the territorial status quo along the Radcliffe Line in Punjab or winning back PoK, either peacefully or through the use, of force might not be impossible but it is quite hard.
  • Reopening the territorial settlement in the Punjab will be a nightmare few would want to think of; getting PoK out of the grip of a nuclear-armed Pakistan will be a bigger challenge.
  • More practical than reworking the territorial disposition of the Punjab boundary or erasing the Line of Control in Kashmir is changing the nature of these frontiers that have long been zones of military confrontation and not commercial cooperation.

 

The need for more cross-border trade between India and Pakistan

  • The SAD also demands reopening the Attari and Hussainiwala borders with Pakistan for trade and tourism to usher in economic prosperity.
  • The problem here is not with India but with Pakistan.
  • Over the last few decades, the Pakistan Army made it clear that it has no interest in economic cooperation with India until the Kashmir question is sorted out to its satisfaction.
  • On the trade front, Pakistan has never given the MFN status to India.
  • Delhi, which gave that status to Pakistan, withdrew it in February 2019 after the terror attack in Pulwama.
  • When India ended the special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, Pakistan suspended all trade ties.
  • For a moment in February 2021, when the two security establishments negotiated a ceasefire agreement, Pakistan signalled interest in resuming trade ties; but there was too much opposition and then Prime Minister Imran Khan shelved the move.

 

A proposal to set up ‘Special Economic Zones’ at Indo-Pak Border

  • The next government in Delhi will, of course, have a chance to take a fresh look at bilateral ties and pick up the threads of engagement from February 2021, when an incremental process of restoring reasonable ties was apparently discussed between the two sides.
  • The new government in Delhi could also look at an interesting proposal from the SAD—the call to make the entire Punjab border into a “special economic zone”.
  • The SAD wants to work with Delhi to bring small and medium enterprises into this zone.
  • It will be interesting to imagine what such a zone could do for India-Pakistan relations when there is freer trade and economic cooperation across the Punjab border.
  • Imagine also Pakistan setting up a similar free zone on its side of the border and the possibilities for integrated development.

 

Is a SEZ along the Indo-Pak border possible?

  • Few had expected that the two countries would translate the long-standing idea of the Kartarpur Sahib Corridor between the two Punjabs into a reality during 2018-19.
  • The idea of a transborder economic zone is not entirely outlandish.
  • It was discussed often in the context of developing economic cooperation across the Pak-Afghan border; it did not go far amidst the turbulence in the bilateral relationship.
  • The idea of trans-border economic zones has considerable traction in South East Asia.
  • Elsewhere in Asia, China has actively encouraged its frontier provinces to embark on cross-border collaboration with neighbouring countries.

 

What is ‘Para-diplomacy’?

  • The ideas put forward by the SAD, in essence, reflect the interests of a people who have paid a high price for the partition of the Punjab.
  • The SAD’s proposals on engaging Pakistan bring to the fore the idea of “para diplomacy” or “sub-state diplomacy” in promoting national interests.
  • This involves formal interactions between entities below the federal level — provincial and local governments — in pursuit of shared national goals.

 

Para Diplomacy and National Government Dynamics

  • Non-Opposition to National Governments: Para diplomacy complements, rather than opposes, national government diplomacy.
  • Federal Nervousness: National governments are wary of sharing authority due to security concerns.
  • Creating Openings: Para diplomacy can create opportunities that rigid national positions cannot.

India-Pakistan Context

  • Substate Diplomacy in Punjab: Occasional meetings between chief ministers of east and west Punjab aimed at cooperation.
  • Survival of Initiatives: These initiatives often falter due to national-level conflicts.

Varying State Engagement in India

  • Different Contexts and Challenges: Indian border states show varying levels of interest in cross-border cooperation.
  • West Bengal's Impact: Under Mamata Banerjee, West Bengal complicated India's engagement with Dhaka.
  • Tamil Nadu's Influence: Tamil parties in Chennai have influenced India's relations with Colombo.

Central and State Government Relations

  • UPA Government Challenges: The UPA government (2004-14) faced resistance from state coalition partners, hindering productive initiatives.
  • NDA Government's Cooperative Federalism: PM Modi's government advocated "cooperative federalism" but conflicts with non-BJP state governments hinder neighbourhood policy collaboration.

 

Conclusion: The next government, irrespective of its political colour, must return to reconsidering para diplomacy as a valuable tool of India’s statecraft. To succeed, India’s neighbourhood policy must work with the interests of the people in the border provinces. This, in turn, demands the construction of a consensus between the centre and the regional parties in the border provinces on developing a productive relationship with the neighbours.