Topic 1 : Red Sea Turbulence
Introduction: The conflict in West Asia has spilled over into one of the world’s busiest trade routes. Since mid-November, Houthi rebels who control large parts of Yemen have been firing drones and missiles on ships in the Red Sea. The rebels, reportedly backed by Iran, claim that the attacks are in solidarity with Hamas.
What is happening in the Red Sea?
- The turmoil has escalated in the last week with Houthi projectiles hitting ships with no clear links with Israel. In the last four days, two commercial ships with Indian connections have been hit.
- On December 23, MV Chem Pluto, a Liberia-flagged, Japan-owned and Netherlands-operated tanker with a largely Indian crew, faced an attack.
- Hours later, MV Sai Baba with 25 Indians on board came under a drone attack in the Southern Red Sea.
- The Yemeni rebels have not claimed responsibility for these attacks.
- But the US Central Command has said that MV Sai Baba faced Houthi belligerence, while MV Chem Pluto was hit by a drone launched from Iran.
Significance of Red Sea trade route
- Connecting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea accounts for nearly 30 per cent of the world’s ship container traffic, 12 per cent of trade, 10 per cent of seaborne petroleum commerce.
- Ships diverted from the waterway will be forced to go around the Cape of Good Hope, pushing trade to the pre-Suez Canal era.
- Many shipping companies have started taking the longer journey, which could increase fuel costs, add days in deliveries and raise prices of imported goods, especially oil from West Asia — this is serious for India which depends on the region for the bulk of its oil supplies.
- Crude prices have been rising since the conflict intensified.
What is the global community doing to secure Red Sea Route?
- Last week, the US launched a multi-national naval force, Operation Prosperity Guardian, to guard against attacks by the rebels.
- The Danish shipping giant Maersk Line Ltd is planning to resume its Red Sea operations.
- But several countries are absent from this US-led force.
- Egypt, which stands to be one of the heaviest losers from the decline in Suez Canal commerce, hasn’t condemned the Houthis.
- Saudi Arabia, which has been negotiating peace with the Yemeni group in recent months, too, hasn’t come out in support of the US-led force.
What can India do to secure the Red Sea Trade Route?
Diplomatic efforts:
- Strengthening communication: Maintaining open channels with Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and international maritime organizations can facilitate information sharing and joint security measures.
- De-escalation: Supporting diplomatic initiatives aimed at ending the conflict in Yemen can contribute to long-term stability in the region.
- International cooperation: Working with like-minded nations to advocate for safe passage in the Red Sea and implement international maritime security regulations.
Security measures:
- Enhanced vigilance: Implementing stricter safety protocols aboard Indian ships, including increased surveillance, stricter identification procedures, and heightened awareness of potential threats.
- Escort arrangements: Seeking temporary naval escorts from friendly nations for high-risk voyages through the Red Sea.
- Defensive technology: Equipping ships with appropriate self-defense measures, such as non-lethal deterrents and improved communication systems.
Alternative routes:
- Exploring alternate shipping routes: Investigating the feasibility of using longer but safer routes, such as the Suez Canal or the Cape of Good Hope, depending on the destination and cargo.
- Port diversification: Considering alternative ports outside the Red Sea for cargo transit, if feasible.
Industry collaboration:
- Information sharing: Establishing a robust system for sharing maritime security intelligence among Indian shipping companies and government agencies.
- Best practices: Encouraging the adoption of industry-wide best practices for risk mitigation and crisis response in high-risk zones.
Conclusion: Threats from Houthi rebels could upend commerce in one of the world’s busiest trade routes. Long-term peace depends on resolution of Israel-Hamas conflict
Topic 2 : Seeing the new South Asia
Introduction: The lament on “losing” South Asia becomes louder when “negative” (from Delhi’s perspective) developments — for example, the Maldives’ recent demand that India withdraw its military presence — occur in the region. India’s South Asia debate, unfortunately, is sentimental, self-referential and disconnected from the changing regional reality.
The hawks and doves in India’s foreign relations
- The hawks are upset that our neighbours dare to challenge India’s presumed primacy in the region.
- The doves think it is all Delhi’s fault that our neighbours turn against India.
- The former want Delhi to be “tougher”, and the latter want Delhi to be “nicer” to the neighbours.
- Neither tough nor nice policies will address India’s regional challenges, which are deeply structural.
- Several internal, regional, and external factors shape the South Asian dissonance.
The British Raj’s hangover in Indian foreign policy doctrine
- The notion that Delhi is losing South Asia is rooted in India’s collective nostalgia for the legacy of the British Raj, which integrated the Subcontinent into a powerful geopolitical entity, established regional hegemony, and turned the neighbouring territories into protectorates and buffers.
- That world is long gone, along with the British departure from the Subcontinent.
- The Subcontinent’s Partition on religious lines sundered its unity, created new sovereignties, and left unresolved boundary and territorial disputes that continue to hobble the region.
- Exalted visions of regional cooperation and an appeal to shared civilisation and history can’t overcome the bitter and enduring legacies of Partition.
The structural problem in the integration of Indian Subcontinent
No real regional organisation
- There is limited possibility of integration of Indian Sub-continent into any regional organisation as EU or ASEAN.
- The SAARC is brain dead and Pakistan is hell-bent to stick to the Kashmir problem and on an economic self-destructive journey to not trade with India.
Protectionist economic policies and lack of economic incentives for integration
- The pre-1991 era saw the protectionist and inward-looking economic policies of nations of the subcontinent, which further strengthened the disintegration of subcontinent.
- The political deference of the regional elites to Delhi, inherited from the days of the Raj, lingered for a few years.
Small neighbours’ fear of India’s hegemonic foreign policy
- Smaller neighbours soon figured that independent India was not the British Raj — which was an extension of the world’s dominant power — and that they had room to play with or against Delhi.
- India might be big, but it can’t simply will their policies in Delhi’s preferred direction. They have an agency of their own.
- India can neither bully them into submission nor sweet talk them into acquiescence in the name of shared identity and culture.
- India’s regional visions might sound good in Delhi but are often seen in the neighbourhood as a cover for pursuing regional hegemony.
The vision of ‘Akhand Bharat’ of Indian elite and fear of loss of sovereignty by small neighbours
- The RSS version of “Akhand Bharat” or “Greater India” or the liberal version of an integrated Subcontinent are both viewed with deep suspicion.
- The neighbouring elites see a fundamental contradiction between a regional order led by India and their national sovereignties.
- Just like India does not want a military alliance with any country, it is no surprise that small power like Maldives is suspicious of any military cooperation (giving military base to India) with India.
India’s presence in domestic politics of neighbours
- Whether it wants or not, India looms large in the domestic politics of our neighbourhood.
- If one competing faction of the neighbourhood elite wants India to intervene on its behalf in the domestic political struggles, the other faction denounces India’s interventionism as hegemonic.
- Those neighbouring elites who seek a sensible relationship with India are accused of compromising national sovereignty.
- The same party and the same leader can adopt both positions at different times. For example, Pakistan former PM Imran Khan once accused then PM Nawaj Sharif for talking to PM Modi who later (Imran Khan) wanted talk To India.
The changed geopolitical reality of subcontinent
- Finally, the idea that India, like the Raj, could keep the Subcontinent as an exclusive sphere of influence was an illusion.
- A partitioned India, which never could match the power of the Raj, had little chance of preserving the old order.
- Pakistan turned to the US and China to balance India.
- The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan turned the north-western subcontinent into a theatre for proxy war among the Western powers, the Middle Eastern states, Russia, and China.
- The consequences of that war have brought mayhem to the borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan and transformed the geopolitical landscape of the Subcontinent.
India’s fear of China’s increasing influence in subcontinent
- India is right to be wary about the dramatic expansion of China’s economic and military influence in the Subcontinent.
- But it can’t stop the world’s second-largest economic and military power from being a powerful actor in the region.
- As Western presence declines in the Subcontinent, the strategic character of the Chinese salience in South Asia — economic, military and technological — will only grow in the coming years and present even more daunting challenges to India.
Entry of other players in t subcontinent’s geopolitics
- China is not the only external power gaining ground in South Asia. The influence of the Middle East — Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates — is rising amidst their growing economic and military capabilities.
- Even as the Subcontinent’s international relations are changing significantly, two of its external frontiers are under great stress.
- In the West, the conflict between the Taliban and the Pakistan army is sharpening.
- In the east, the ethnic armed groups and pro-democracy forces have joined hands to seriously challenge the Burmese army’s control of its vast northern territories.
- Together, these developments point to the emergence of a Subcontinent very different from the one we inherited in the middle of the 20th century.
- “Regions” are not static; their geographic shape, political structure, and economic orientation evolve over time. “South Asia” is no exception.
Conclusion: The real question, then, is not about India “losing South Asia” but finding ways to gain ground in a changing region. India has enough capabilities to not only preserve its interests, but also expand its influence in its neighbourhood. To do that effectively, though, Delhi must discard the obsession with the old South Asia.